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Abstract
In this study, we defined and quantified the degree of cognitive conflict induced by
a discrepant event from a cognitive perspective. Based on the scheme developed, we
investigated the relationship between cognitive conflict and conceptual change, and
the influences of students’ cognitive characteristics on conflict in learning the concept of density. Subjects were 171 seventh-grade girls from two city middle schools
in Korea. Tests regarding logical thinking ability, field dependence/independence,
and meaningful learning approach were administered. A preconception test and a
test of responses to a discrepant event were also administered. Computer-assisted
instruction was then provided to students as a conceptual change intervention. A
conception test was administered as a posttest. In analyzing students’ responses to
the discrepant event, seven types of responses were identified: Rejection, reinterpretation, exclusion, uncertainty, peripheral belief change, belief decrease, and belief change. These types were then ordered into four levels. The results indicated
that there existed a significant correlation between cognitive conflict and conceptual change. t-test results revealed that there were statistically significant differences in the degree of cognitive conflict by the levels of students’ logical thinking
ability and field dependence/independence. Meaningful learning approach, however, was found to have no statistically significant effect on cognitive conflict. Educational implications are discussed.
Keywords: cognitive conflict, discrepant event, science concept learning
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Over the last twenty years, research on students’ conceptual understanding in science has been quite active. The importance of students’
preinstructional or alternative conceptions was a common theme running through this area of research (Scott, Asoko, & Driver, 1992), and
numerous researchers continue to investigate students’ conceptions
in various content domains (e.g., Borges & Gilbert, 1999; Roald &
Mikalsen, 2000; Teixeira, 2000; Tytler, 2000; Voska & Heikkinen,
2000). Previous research pointed out that many students’ preconceptions, if not all, are often both pervasive and resistant to change
through traditional expository forms of instruction, and simply informing students of scientific conceptions is not enough. According to
the alternative conception paradigm(e.g.,Driver, 1994), students’ preconceptions are impervious to change because their preconceptions
are not merely mistakes or false beliefs but instead, students possess
their own cognitive support groups and defense mechanisms (Strike &
Posner, 1992). Based on this viewpoint, several learning models were
proposed (e.g., conceptual change model, generative learning model,
etc.). Among them, the conceptual change model has been often applied to situations in which the target learning outcome is to change
students’ misconceptions.
The conceptual change model describes learning as the interaction
that takes place between a student’s experience and his/her current
conception. Therefore, many studies on conceptual change have focused on establishing conditions that promote situations where the
student’s existing conception can be made explicit and then is directly challenged to create a state of conflict. As a result, many conceptual change models incorporate specifically designed strategies
called cognitive conflict approaches (Chan, Burtis, & Bereiter, 1997).
Based on the theoretical model described by Posner, Strike, Hewson,
and Gertzog (1982), this approach generally involves identifying a student’s current state of knowledge and bringing about conflict so that
he/she can replace the preconception with a scientifically accepted
conception.
The concept of cognitive conflict has its origin in Piaget’s theory of
equilibration. The need to reduce conflict is a powerful human motivation. Therefore, many Piagetian advocates believe that experiencing conflict is indispensable to learning. The concept of cognitive conflict also has had much influence on science education researchers,
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especially those who work in the area of concept learning. Some of
these researchers regard cognitive conflict as a necessary condition
for conceptual change in learning science concepts. Although the cognitive conflict approach is one of the most frequently investigated
strategies and consistently shows significant effects (Guzzetti, Snyder,
Glass, & Gamas, 1993), some researchers have raised questions about
the role of cognitive conflict. Zimmerman and Blom (1983) investigated whether cognitive conflict is a precondition to acquire conservation of weight. They were not able to find any evidence, however,
supporting the necessity of cognitive conflict. They sarcastically concluded that “Although there is extensive evidence that (cognitive) conflict has been a useful condition in the minds of theorists to explain
learning, there is little evidence that (cognitive) conflict is widely experienced in the minds of learners.” (parentheses added by present
authors). Other science education researchers (Dreyfus, Jungwirth, &
Eliovitch, 1990; Linn, 1986; Tsai, 2000; Vosniadou, 1999) also pointed
out that students are often unable to achieve meaningful conflict or to
become dissatisfied with their preconceptions, even when confronted
with conditions involving conflict. Moreover, even if the conflict is
highlighted by some means, there is no guarantee that students will
accept either its existence or its significance (Scott et al., 1992).
Is it a merely false belief that cognitive conflict is a necessary condition for conceptual change? Previous research that has investigated
the effect of the cognitive conflict approach in science education, however, has consistently reported positive results. How can we accept
these disparate views on cognitive conflict? One reason for this inconsistency might be that there are different interpretations of cognitive
conflict. Science education researchers have examined the effects of
cognitive conflict mainly on the bases of comparisons of group differences, and they tended to implement a combination of strategies and
then evaluate their total impact (Guzzetti et al., 1993). In addition,
cognitive conflict is often described briefly or not at all (Gorsky& Finegold, 1994). As a result, it is not easy to grasp the explicit meaning of cognitive conflict in science education research. Therefore, the
definition of cognitive conflict should be more explicit and more specific in order to investigate the role of cognitive conflict in producing
conceptual change.
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Cognitive Conflict and Discrepant Event
Berlyne (1970) described cognitive conflict as “a condition in which
mutually interfering processes occur simultaneously and in which selection of a motor response from a set of competing alternatives is
therefore hampered” (p. 968). Unlike previous ones, his definition
gave cognitive conflict a kind of generality such that the significance
of cognitive conflict was seriously taken into consideration in a wide
variety of learning situations (Cantor, 1983). The concept of cognitive conflict was more specifically explained by Hewson (1988), and
Stavy and Berkovitz (1980). They identified that there are two kinds
of cognitive conflict related to the different forms of equilibration in
Piaget’s theory; the conflict between a student’s conception and the
experience, and the conflict between two different cognitive structures related to the same phenomenon. Of these two kinds of conflict,
we will focus on the former because it is a key construct involved in
phenomena known as discrepant events. Discrepant events have been
one of the most important components in science education research
based on the cognitive conflict approach, because dissatisfaction with
an existing conception is central to the process of conceptual change
and a discrepant event is the major source of initial dissatisfaction
(Posner et al., 1982).
Generally, a discrepant event is the physical experience that provides students with novel evidence to contradict their existing conceptions. The instructional use of a discrepant event assumes that it could
induce cognitive conflict. When students encounter a discrepant event,
it is expected that they should discover that their preconceptions are
inadequate to explain the new experience, which might lead them to
consider or invent alternative conceptions that can account for the discrepant event. However, it has been reported that students in many
cases do not necessarily arouse cognitive conflict through merely experiencing a discrepant event (e.g., Chinn & Brewer, 1998; Gorsky &
Finegold, 1994; Mason, 2001; Shepardson & Moje, 1999; Tirosh, Stavy,
& Cohen, 1998). According to Murray (1983), even if the contradictory event was presented to students, it may be (a) simply unnoticed,
(b) tolerated or explained as paradox, mystery, or magic, (c) seen as
an independent event, or (d) resolved prematurely or trivially by the
discard of conflicting elements.
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Perhaps, a simple falsification view of science has had too much influence on the research grouped under the cognitive conflict approach.
At the same time, however, it is also unreasonable to simply underestimate or disregard the role of a discrepant event, because there have
been only a few studies in which a separate corroborative measure of
cognitive conflict was collected. Thus, the relationship between a discrepant event and conceptual change needs to be more fully clarified.
Zimmerman and Blom (1983) tried to operationalize cognitive conflict induced when preoperational first graders were presented with
videotapes of varying degrees of conflict regarding conservation problems. They used two kinds of measures in quantifying cognitive conflict. First, based on Smedslund’s (1961) operational definition of cognitive conflict, they chose students’ hesitation or latency in rendering
judgments to items asked during an individual interview, as one indicator of conflict. Their second index of conflict was the students’ selfreport, 3-point rating of feelings of uncertainty–certainty toward their
responses to given items. More recently, Vandenplas-Holper (1996)
measured cognitive conflict with 5 to 7-year-old children working on
conservation tasks in triads. He used the sum of three markers as the
degree of cognitive conflict: (a) spontaneous intra-individual conflict
that occurs when the children disagree among themselves by using
marked indicators of disagreement within the same time interval or
within two adjacent intervals, (b) the number of experimenter’s statements that stress intra- or inter-individual conflict, and (c) the number of children’s surprises with such interjections as “ah” or “oh.” In
a study investigating students’ responses to specific information that
contradicted their naive conceptions regarding evolution, Chan et al.
(1997) measured students’ belief change by asking students to indicate on an 11-point scale whether they agreed or disagreed with given
statements. Two experts also evaluated each student’s response using the protocols of the interview. A criterion measure was then constructed to represent the average rating of the protocols. Correlations
between students’ ratings and the criterion measures were computed
and used as the degree of belief change.
To sum up, investigators attempting to quantify cognitive conflict
generally have measured either students’ overt behaviors or students’
ratings of given statements or problems. It seems apparent that student’s overt behavior like hesitation, surprise, or talking to oneself
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could be one of the hallmarks of cognitive conflict (Cantor, 1983).
On the contrary, conflict could be only one of many possible reasons
for those behaviors. Furthermore, the relationship between students’
overt behaviors (i.e., hesitation, etc.) and cognitive conflict is not so
direct as to regard the scores obtained from the observation of students’ behaviors as the degree of cognitive conflict. The style and/or
intensity of behavior expressing his/her conflict must vary from student to student so that we should never overlook the influence of the
student’s personality on that relationship. The other index, the self-report of belief, also should be seriously questioned. The problem here
is that the score obtained from a self-report does not equal the degree
of cognitive conflict induced but instead the degree of a student’s subjective feeling about the given experience. Therefore, a more direct
indicator that can detect psychological vacillations is needed in order
to enhance the validity of measuring cognitive conflict.
In this study, therefore, we sought to examine the relationship between cognitive conflict induced by a discrepant event and conceptual change. To this end, we devised a scheme for measuring cognitive conflict from students’ responses to a discrepant event. Based on
this scheme, then, we explore the relationship between cognitive conflict and conceptual change.
We also investigate the influences of students’ cognitive characteristics on the type of responses to discrepant events and the cognitive
conflict it arouses. The success of using discrepant events in conceptual change learning probably depends on the willingness and ability
of students to recognize the overt conflict. Thus, it could be assumed
that students’ cognitive characteristics might be crucial factors when
teachers use discrepant events to initiate cognitive conflict. Based on
a synthesis of the research evidence cited in the relevant literature,
we investigate the influences of three cognitive variables which deserve special attention: logical thinking ability, field dependence/independence, and learning approach.
In order to reach a state of cognitive conflict, students need to determine whether discrepant events are or are not valid and whether
discrepant events are or are not congruent with their existing conceptions (Chinn & Brewer, 1993). Thus, students who cannot effectively use logical hypothetic-deductive reasoning (Lawson & Thompson, 1988) might fail to exhibit cognitive conflict in response to a
discrepant event. Field dependence/independence, which is related to
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an individual’s cognitive style concerning how successfully he/she can
disembed relevant information from a complex and potentially confusing background (Witkin, Moore, Goodenough, & Cos, 1977), might be
also a factor that influences cognitive conflict. Finally, students’ learning approaches might also influence cognitive conflict – whether students accept the conflicting evidence and accommodate their existing
conceptions or whether they use various coping tactics to avoid conflict. Because, as Donn (1989) reported, students classified as using a
meaningful learning strategy tended to respond to novel problems by
self-questioning and by relating and elaborating ideas, whereas their
counterparts tended to respond by stating definitions and by failing
to elaborate upon their ideas.

Methods
Target Misconception
On choosing a concept to use in this study, several criteria were
considered. First, we needed a concept that has been reported as difficult for students to learn through traditional expository instruction. Second, the concept should have been documented as one about
which many students have a similar misconception. Third, the concept should be intelligible to students. Finally, the concept should be
one for which a discrepant event exists to confront the misconception. The concept satisfying our criteria was density. Many researchers and educators have reported that density is a difficult concept to
teach (e.g., Rieck, 1994; Shepherd & Renner, 1982), and traditional
approaches to teaching density have had limited success at best at
promoting a scientifically accepted conception (Hewson & Hewson,
1983; Rowell & Dawson, 1977). One of the inherent difficulties with
the concept of density, unfortunately, is that there is no direct way of
measuring it. Some investigators have pointed out the complexity of
the concept. That is, the concept of density is difficult because it requires an understanding of ratio and proportion (Rowell & Dawson,
1977) or because it is a compound variable dealing with two simultaneous variables, mass and volume (Adey & Shayer, 1988). The result that even older students had difficulties in understanding density
(Hewson, 1986), however, means that there might be another factor
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to consider. According to Smith, Snir, and Grosslight (1992), students
generally have alternative conceptual frameworks for matter so that
developing a concept of density should require a restructuring of their
frameworks.
An undifferentiated weight-density concept is one of the most prevailing misconceptions among middle school students (Hewson &
Hewson, 1983;Noh, Kang, Kim, Chae, & Noh, 1997; Rowell & Dawson,
1977; Smith, Carey, & Wiser, 1985). Students fail to distinguish between weight and density. Instead, they unite components from both
concepts in one undifferentiated weight-density concept (Smith et
al., 1985) because mass, volume, and weight are correlated in everyday life (Klopfer, Champagne, & Chaiklin, 1992). As a result, students
usually use a poorly differentiated concept like “amount” instead of
weight or density (Noh et al., 1997). Some researchers (e.g., Noh et al.,
1997; Smith et al., 1992), nonetheless, have demonstrated that appropriate conceptual change instruction can lead some 7th graders to understand the concept of density. Finally, a list of observable discrepant events that contradict the misconception is also available. Since
the undifferentiated weight density concept satisfied all our criteria,
we chose it as the target misconception of this study.
Participants
This study was carried out with 350 grade 7 students (13 or 14
years old) in Korea. According to the National Science Curriculum
of Korea, the concept of density should be taught at grade 8. Therefore, none of the students had been formally taught the density concept. All participants were girls and were selected from two city middle schools. We needed schools that possessed a multimedia center
equipped with enough personal computers (i.e., at least one computer
for each student) in order to conduct our research. However, it is not
so easy to arrange to use schools satisfying this condition because, in
Korea, the average number of students per class is still about 35 so
that most instruction using computers generally proceeds in pairs.
Moreover, though many middle schools have been changed to reflect
a coeducational status, there are still many boys’ and girls’ schools in
Korea. Because of the difficulties for arranging schools and necessity
of having students work independently on a personal computer, we
were obliged to select two girls’ schools.
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While conceptual change models have been widely advocated for
helping students deal with misconceptions, little research has examined the relation between conceptual change and gender (Chambers &
Andre, 1997). Though it has been often reported that there is a science
achievement difference between boys and girls, a major review of gender and science education indicated that the differences decrease to
a trivial level among younger students (Kahle & Meece, 1994). Chambers and Andre (1997) also reported that, when students’ interest
level, experience, and prior knowledge had been controlled, there was
no significant difference by gender in learning direct current concepts
through the conceptual change approach. Thus, although the potential for a gender difference might exist, we did not perceive it to be a
likely threat to the validity of our research results.
Instruments
Preconception test
For the purposes of this study, there was a need to exclude students
who did not exhibit the target misconception. We developed a preconception test designed as a tool for choosing appropriate subjects and
piloted it twice. In this test, students were asked to answer the question – “When two balls of the same size were dropped into the water, a small black ball weighing 100 g floated whereas a small gray
ball weighing 500 g sank. Here is a 1,000 g large black ball made of
same material as the small black ball. Does it sink or float when it is
dropped into the water?” – and to explain reasons for their answers.
Test of responses to a discrepant event
A Test of Responses to a Discrepant Event (TRDE) was developed
to examine the ways in which students respond to a discrepant event.
This test was a modification of an instrument that Chinn and Brewer
(1998) used. They used four different initial theories and six different pieces of anomalous data to increase the diversity of students’
responses. Our purpose, however, was to investigate the influences
of a given discrepant event on conceptual change in science instruction. Thus, we presented all students with only one initial theory and
one discrepant event in the TRDE, because teachers generally present
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their students with a single discrepant event with the intent to contradict the most widely held misconception(s). The TRDE was also pilot-tested twice in order to verify students’ comprehension of it. The
TRDE consists of the following three parts: Initial explanation, discrepant event, and students’ rating. Each part is elaborated upon in
the next three paragraphs.
Initial explanation: Students read a text in which a man suggesting that the large black ball weighing 1,000 g must sink because it is
much heavier than the gray ball which also sank. In order to support
this explanation, some evidentiary examples were also presented here
(e.g., “A piece of stone or iron sinks because it is heavy, but a block of
wood or Styrofoam floats because it is light.”). We expected that students who had the target misconception would enhance the credibility
of their ideas after reading this text. As a check of initial belief, students were asked to write whether they believed this initial explanation or not, immediately after they had read it.
Discrepant event: After reading the text which supported their initial beliefs, students read another text concerning a discrepant event
which contradicted the initial explanation. An experimental result of
a middle school student was described in the text. “Actually, a 100 g
small plastic ball floated whereas a 500 g small iron ball sank in the
water. However, a 1,000 g large plastic ball also floated contrary to
the initial explanation.” To reduce students’ doubt about the reliability of the experimental result, it was emphasized that other students
in the class obtained the same results. In comparing their initial beliefs with the given discrepant event, we expected to evoke conflict in
students holding the misconception.
Students’ rating: In this part, students evaluated both the discrepant event and the initial explanation. First, students rated the believability of the discrepant event (i.e., chose one from “I believe,” “I do
not believe,” and “I do not know”) and produced reasons for their ratings. Second, students rated the extent of consistency between the discrepant event and the initial explanation (i.e., chose one from “consistent,” “inconsistent,” and “I do not know”). They also gave written
explanations for their ratings. Finally, students reported whether their
belief had changed after having read the discrepant event, and explained their reasons.
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Conception test
We developed a conception test to examine whether the target misconception changed to the scientific conception. Several test items
were constructed on the basis of previous research concerning students’ misconceptions about density (Adey & Shayer, 1988; Klopfer et
al., 1992; Noh et al., 1997). Two rounds of pilot tests were conducted
on 8th-grade Korean middle school students to eliminate or modify inappropriate items. The final version of the conception test consisted of four items. All conception test items were written in a multiple-choice format. Each item contained, in addition, an accompanying
open–ended section to collect information about students’ rationales
for their choices. The face validity of the test was verified by a panel of
experts consisting of three science educators and three middle school
teachers. The Cronbach’s internal consistency reliability coefficient for
this test was .73. A 3-point scale was developed to rate the conception
test. No and irrelevant responses were rated as a “0,” responses indicating partial understanding (i.e., rationales were incomplete even
though the correct option was chosen) were rated as a “1,” and responses showing sound understanding were rated as a “2.” Two raters
independently scored a subset of randomly selected students’ answers.
Each disagreement was discussed by the raters and then resolved. After 90% interrater agreement was obtained, one rater scored all the
answers and the other independently checked the scoring.
Tests of cognitive variables
Three tests were administered to measure students’ cognitive characteristics in this study. All three tests were translated into Korean
from English. The translation was verified by three science educators.
Furthermore, we interviewed several students during pilot studies to
verify whether students correctly understood the meanings of items.
All of these students were, in science, of below average achievement
level. Only a few minor problems were detected in responses from students and the inappropriate wordings of items were revised with the
help of middle school teachers.
Students’ logical thinking ability was measured with the short-version Group Assessment of Logical Thinking (GALT; Roadrangka, Yeany,
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& Padilla, 1983) which includes 2 items each for the following 6 types
of reasoning: Conservation, proportional reasoning, controlling variables, probabilistic reasoning, correlational reasoning, and combinational reasoning. The total scores range from 0 to 12. The Cronbach’s
internal consistency reliability coefficient for the sample used in this
study was determined as .70.
Field dependence/independence was assessed by the Find-A-Shape
Puzzle (FASP; Linn & Kyllonen, 1981). This test measures students’
ability to disembed relevant information from an irrelevant background. Linn and Kyllonen showed that the FASP loads on the same
factor as previously validated field dependence/independence instruments. In this test, students must find simple figures concealed in five
complex ones in a given time limit. One point is awarded for correctly
locating each simple figure; the total scores range from 0 to 20. The
internal consistency reliability coefficient was .89 for the scores obtained in this study.
Previous research revealed that students have predisposed learning orientations (Cavallo, 1996; Cavallo & Schafer, 1994; Entwistle
& Ramsden, 1983). In order to identify their learning orientations,
students were given a Meaningful Learning Approach Questionnaire
(MLAQ) selected from the Revised Approaches to Studying Inventory
(RASI; Entwistle & Tait, 1994) designed to assess students’ approaches
to learning. The RASI consists of five subcategories: Deep approach,
surface approach, strategic approach, lack of direction, and academic
self-confidence orientations. Since item separability of the deep, surface, and strategic approach subcategories had been validated (Duff,
1997), we used 10 questions that addressed students’ deep (meaningful) learning approaches in this study. The instrument asked students
to respond to questions regarding how they learn, ranging from 1 (disagree) to 5 (agree). An internal consistency reliability coefficient of
.81 was obtained for this test.
Procedure
To investigate their cognitive characteristics, students were administered the GALT, the FASP, and the MLAQ. Next, the preconception test for identifying students in possession of the target misconception and the TRDE for examining their responses to a discrepant
event were conducted. Finally, after completing all pretests, students
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were exposed to 15 minutes of conceptual change intervention concerning the concept of density. In order to control the influences of
teacher and learning environment on students’ learning, we developed a computer program using the Macromedia Flash 5 that has advantages in creating animations and presentations. Computer assisted
instruction (CAI) using this program was implemented as the intervention. Students were assigned to work individually on the CAI program to exclude the possibility that interpersonal interactions might
influence their individual learning.
The CAI program was devised to correspond to the concept introduction and application stages of general conceptual change models.
Through the CAI program, students were first presented with animation showing that weight cannot be a criterion for predicting whether
a certain object would sink or float. The new concept, density which
was defined as the mass per unit volume, was then introduced as an
alternative criterion for predicting a “sink or float” problem. At the
end of the CAI program, students were provided with some application problems and received feedback when it was necessary.
On designing the content of the CAI program, in addition, we decided to concentrate on explaining the phenomenon, a “sink or float”
problem, at a macroscopic level because the microscopic view of matter is not necessary to achieve an understanding of the distinction between weight and density. Scientists had also achieved a clear differentiation between weight and density even before their acceptance
of an atomic theory of matter in the history of science (Smith et al.,
1985).No attempt was made to teach students the distinction between
weight and mass because the numeric value of the two quantities is
proportional on the Earth and this distinction is not requirement for
seventh graders to understand the core concept of density. Students
completed the conception test the day after the instructional protocol.
From an original pool of 350 students, we included 171 subjects in
this study. First, 130 students were excluded because their answers to
the preconception test indicated that they did not possess the target
misconception. Another 27 students were eliminated because they did
not agree with the initial explanation. Although these students also had
chosen the wrong option in the preconception test as had the subjects,
we regarded their disagreement with the given initial explanation as
indicating a possibility that they had other misconceptions. Finally, 22
students were ineligible because they did not complete all tests.
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Cognitive Conflict Scoring Protocol
Unlike previous research which focused on either students’ behaviors as expressions of conflict or students’ self-ratings, we wanted a
more direct method of quantifying cognitive conflict. The extent of
cognitive conflict induced by a discrepant event appears to be a function of the interaction between a student’s existing conception and
his/her new experience. The greater the difficulty in reconciling an
existing conception and a discrepant event, the greater the conflict.
For example, if students were able to cope with a discrepant event by
making relatively minor changes to their existing conceptions, then
it would lead to a low state of cognitive conflict. Moreover, when they
are working on the process of assimilation, a limited restructuring
of an existing conception, students typically show certain responses
like adjusting or distorting the experience to conform to their existing conceptions (Tsai, 2000). Therefore, responses to a discrepant
event might be one of the indicators for quantifying cognitive conflict.
It has been reported that students make a diverse range of responses to discrepant events (Chinn & Brewer, 1993, 1998; Gorsky&
Finegold, 1994; Mason, 2001; Shepardson & Moje, 1999; Tirosh et al.,
1998). Gorsky and Finegold (1994) investigated students’ responses
to an anomaly regarding “forces.” They asked nine high school students to set up a force array showing the forces he/she claims are
acting on an object and then presented each of them with a simulation of the resulting behavior of the system. They hypothesized that
cognitive conflict might be generated when the simulated behavior is
clearly incompatible with a student’s expectation (i.e., based on their
real-world experience). They analyzed students’ verbal responses as
students learned with the simulation and classified these responses
into several types according to the extent of the conflict generated:
despair, rejection, skepticism, and curiosity. Chinn and Brewer (1998)
also reported several ways in which students respond to anomalous
data: (a) ignoring the data; (b) rejecting the data; (c) professing uncertainty about the validity of the data; (d) excluding the data; (e)
holding the data in abeyance; (f) reinterpreting the data; (g) accepting the data and making peripheral theory change; and (h), accepting the data and changing their theory. In their studies, Chinn and
Brewer proposed more specific criteria for the exploration of students’
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responses to discrepant events: Believability of a discrepant event, inconsistency between a discrepant event and students’ existing conceptions, and belief change after experiencing a discrepant event. These
criteria have the merit of dealing with conflict directly from a cognitive perspective.
In this study, first, we classified students’ responses to a discrepant event into the following seven types:
1. Rejection: Denying the validity of the discrepant event,
2. Reinterpretation: Interpreting the discrepant event differently
within the frameworks of their existing conceptions,
3. Exclusion: Considering the discrepant event as irrelevant to
their existing conceptions,
4. Uncertainty: Being confident in neither the discrepant event
nor their existing conceptions,
5. Peripheral belief change: Accepting the discrepant event by
making minor changes to their existing conceptions,
6. Belief decrease: Feeling dissatisfaction with their existing conceptions but not being confident of their decisions,
7. Belief change: Feeling dissatisfaction with their existing conceptions and completely giving them up.
The classifications were based on the students’ written responses
in the TRDE, which possesses three questions that are consistent with
the three requisite criteria proposed by Chinn and Brewer (1998).
Two raters independently classified a subset of randomly selected responses. Discrepancies between the raters were then discussed and
resolved. This discussion/resolution procedure was repeated until
the intercoder agreement reached 90%. Then, one rater classified all
the responses again while the other rater independently checked the
classification.
According to Posner et al. (1982), cognitive conflict is generated
when students feel dissatisfaction with their existing conceptions.
Thus, for the purposes of this study, we operationalized cognitive conflict as the degree of dissatisfaction a student exhibits with his/her
existing conception after being presented with a discrepant event.
Limón and Carretero (1997) also suggested that there are different
types of responses to a discrepant event that could be ordered in a
continuum from the least acceptance of the discrepant event to the
most acceptance of it. Of the seven types, rejection, reinterpretation,
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and exclusion are reported to produce no change in students’ beliefs in
their existing conceptions (Chinn & Brewer, 1993; Gorsky & Finegold,
1994) so that these responses were rated as a “0.” Uncertainty is a response type that indicates no confidence in the validity of a discrepant event as well as an existing conception; such responses were rated
as a “1.” Responses classified into peripheral belief change and belief
decrease indicate dissatisfaction with an existing conception, at least
to some extent, and were rated as a “2.” Belief change, a function of
entire dissatisfaction with an existing conception, was rated as a “3.”

Results
Students’ Responses to the Discrepant Event
Seven types of responses were found in the analyses of students’
responses to the discrepant event: rejection, reinterpretation, exclusion, uncertainty, peripheral belief change, belief decrease, and belief change (Table 1).
Thirty-two students (18.7%) rejected the discrepant event. They
did not believe the discrepant event although they were aware of the
inconsistency between the discrepant event and their existing conceptions. With rejection, there was no belief change. Rejection was
the most common response type among students who decided not to
change their existing conceptions in our study. Over 70 percent of

Table 1. Frequencies (and Percentage) of Responses to the Discrepant Event.
Type of responses

This study

Chinn & Brewer (1998)

Ignoring
Rejection
Reinterpretation
Exclusion
Abeyance
Uncertainty
Peripheral belief change
Belief decrease
Belief change
Total

–
32 (18.7)
7 (4.1)
11 (6.4)
–
13 (7.6)
17 (9.9)
24 (14.0)
67 (39.2)
171 (100∗)

15 (8.2)
61 (33.5)
43 (23.6)
4 (2.2)
17 (9.3)
31 (17.0)
3 (1.6)
–
8 (4.4)
182 (100∗)

∗ Differences from 100% due to recording errors.
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these students (23 out of 32) seemed not to be able to accept the result of the discrepant event probably because their initial beliefs were
just too strong: “How could the lighter object float? It’s impossible.”
or “The heavy object should sink, and the light object should float.
It’s so natural.” Whereas six students raised more specific questions
regarding the validity of the experiment: “Why did the student use
two kinds of balls (i.e., plastic and iron) in his experiment? He should
have used only one kind of ball.” (parenthesis added by present authors) or “If the plastic ball weighed 1 kg, it’s too bulky to be dropped
into the water tank.”
Seven students (4.1%) distorted the discrepant event and regarded
it as consistent with their beliefs. As a result, no change was made in
their existing conceptions. Most of these students (5 out of 7) had a
concept of heaviness that held two different meanings. For example,
one of these students explained her reason as “I believe the result of
the experiment because plastic is a light material by nature. So, the
plastic ball could float though it is heavier than the iron ball which
sank.” It is apparent that these students used the term heavy or light
for two entirely different meanings; one as the weight and the other
as the property of the material. It should be also noted here that a few
students, who rejected the discrepant event, also tended to be confused in using appropriate terms, but this tendency had little influence
on their responses to the discrepant event. For the students who reinterpreted the discrepant event, however, the dual meaning of heaviness had a marked impact on their reactions to the discrepant event.
Eleven students (6.4%) excluded the discrepant event. They believed the result of the discrepant event and agreed that it was not
consistent with their existing conceptions. However, there was no belief change because the discrepant event was taken as having no direct
connection with their existing conceptions or merely a kind of exception. Most of them (10 out of 11) were found to have a dual meaning
for the heaviness concept like those classified as being the “reinterpretation” type. It was so natural to them that the plastic ball, which
weighs more than the iron ball, floated because plastic is a light material by nature. Therefore, there is no reason for them to change their
existing conceptions.
Thirteen students (7.6%) responded that they could not decide
whether they should give up their existing conceptions or not. Unlike
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other response types, responses to the three criteria were highly diverse among students classified to this category; someone agreed to
the believability and/or the inconsistency, but others did not. The only
thing that individuals in this category had in common, is that their decisions were not settled yet. One student said, “After reading the result of the experiment, I don’t know which one is right.”
Seventeen students (9.9%) accepted the discrepant event by making some modifications to their existing conceptions. Eleven of them
were also found to possess a dual meaning for the heaviness concept.
Unlike those students categorized as a “reinterpretation” or an “exclusion” type, however, they revamp their existing conceptions to some
extent: “Heavy objects generally sink. But it’s not always right. If the
material is very light, even heavy objects could float.” Five of them
tended to revise their existing conceptions more systematically: “I
found out my mistake. The kinds of material also affect the sinking or
floating of objects. So, you must consider both the weight and the kind
of material in predicting whether a certain object would sink or float.”
Twenty-four students (14.0%) believed the discrepant event and
found out that the discrepant event was not consistent with their existing conceptions. As a result, they agreed that their existing conceptions had some problems. However, they hesitated to completely
abandon them. Representative reasons for the decrease of conviction
toward their existing conceptions, were the superiority of the experimental result (“I think the experimental result is more reliable than
a simple opinion.”) and the limitation of their existing conceptions in
terms of explanatory power (“If the material is light like plastic, my
initial thought is not right any longer.”).
Belief change was the most frequent response type in this study.
Sixty-seven students (39.2%) showed clear signs of abandoning their
existing conceptions. The major reason given by these students (28
out of 67) was the superiority of the experimental result over an opinion: “I gave up my initial thought because the experiment showed me
clear evidence.” Although no alternative concept was presented by
the TRDE, 25 students indicated their own alternative explanations:
“Whether a certain kind of object would sink or float is dependent
on the material of that object.” In some cases (3 students), the target
misconception was replaced by another misconception: “It’s not the
weight but the volume that decides whether an object would sink or
float.”
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Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations of the Tests.

Mean
SD

GALT
(n = 170)

FASP
(n = 165)

MLAQ
(n = 167)

TRDE
(n = 171)

Conception test
(n = 171)

4.08
2.44

10.03
5.06

29.54
5.88

1.73
1.25

4.01
2.56

Table 3. Correlation Coefficients among Variables.
Variable
Logical thinking ability (GALT)
Field dependence/independence (FASP)
Meaningful Learning approach (MLAQ)
Cognitive conflict (TRDE)
Conceptual change (Conception test)

GALT
–

FASP

.258**
.224**
.154*
.511**

–

MLAQ

.213**
.240**
.292**

TRDE

–

.033
.195*

–

.232**

* p < .05
** p < .01

Relationship between Cognitive Conflict and Conceptual Change
Means and standard deviations of the tests administered are presented in Table 2. Pearson correlation coefficients among students’
test scores are presented in Table 3. The correlation coefficient, between the TRDE scores and the conception test scores, was statistically significant (p < .01). The scores of the GALT and the FASP showed
statistically significant correlations with the score of the TRDE (p <
.05 and p < .01, respectively). The scores of the GALT, the FASP, and
the MLAQ were also significantly correlated statistically with the conception test scores.
Types of Responses and the Degree of Cognitive Conflict by
Cognitive Variables
In order to investigate the effects of students’ cognitive characteristics on the degree of cognitive conflict, we selected students from
the top 25% (high level) and from the bottom 25% (low level) based
on the scores of the GALT, the FASP, and the MLAQ respectively. Then,
we compared the distributions of response types (Table 4) and the
scores of the TRDE (Table 5) between the two groups.
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Table 4. Frequencies (and Percentage) of Students’ Responses to the Discrepant Event by
Levels of the Cognitive Variables.
Type of responses

GALT 		
Low
High

FASP		
Low
High

MLAQ
Low

High

Rejection
Reinterpretation
Exclusion
Uncertainty
Perip. belief change
Belief decrease
Belief change
Total

5 (22.7)
2 (9.1)
1 (4.5)
2 (9.1)
–
4 (18.2)
8 (36.4)
22

11 (31.4)
3 (8.6)
5 (14.3)
3 (8.6)
3 (8.6)
4 (11.4)
6 (17.1)
35

10 (27.0)
–
3 (8.1)
3 (8.1)
4 (10.8)
3 (8.1)
14 (37.8)
37

7 (17.5
2 (5.0)
2 (5.0)
2 (5.0)
5 (12.5)
3 (7.5)
19 (47.5)
40

4 (12.1)
–
1 (3.0)
–
8 (24.2)
2 (6.1)
18 (54.5)
33

8 (20.5)
–
1 (2.6)
5 (12.8)
5 (12.8)
3 (7.7)
17 (43.6)
39

Table 5. T -test Results on the Degree of Cognitive Conflict by the Levels of Cognitive
Variables.
Variable
GALT
FASP
MLAQ

Low

Mean (SD) 		
High

t

df

p

1.55 (1.34)
1.00 (1.21)
1.59 (1.32)

2.24 (1.06)
1.85 (1.23)
1.88 (1.28)

2.150
2.980
.944 75

53
72
.348

.036
.004

For students with high logical thinking ability there were more
belief change responses whereas there were more rejection and reinterpretation responses for those with low logical thinking ability.
A t-test result showed that the difference between the TRDE scores
of these two groups was statistically significant (p < .05). These results indicated that students with high logical thinking ability tended
to accept the discrepant event and feel dissatisfaction with their existing conceptions whereas those with low logical thinking ability
tended to respond in unexpected ways and to maintain their own
existing conceptions. In the analyses of the effects of field dependence/independence on cognitive conflict, more obvious differences
between the high and the low groups were found. Field independent students made more responses of belief change whereas field
dependent students made more responses of rejection and reinterpretation. The differences between the TRDE scores of these two
groups were also found to be statistically significant (p < .01). That
is, more cognitive conflict was aroused for the field independent
students than for the field dependent students after experiencing
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the discrepant event. In the case of learning approach, more belief
change responses were found for students with a meaningful learning strategy whereas more rejection responses were found for their
counterparts. The TRDE scores of the two groups, however, were not
significantly different. Unlike logical thinking ability or field dependence/independence, meaningful learning approach was found to
have little effect on inducing cognitive conflict.

Discussion
Quantifying Cognitive Conflict
At first, we predicted that the students’ responses to the discrepant
event would fall into the eight response types as Chinn and Brewer
(1998) proposed. However, two of them, ignoring and abeyance did
not fit for our study although they had been both finely defined and
had been encountered as responses in the test of the taxonomy. These
inconsistencies might result from characteristics specific to the topic
of density and/or the discrepant event used in our study.
First, ignoring and rejection merged into one response type. The
only difference between ignoring and rejection, according to Chinn
and Brewer (1998), is whether students try to explain why they cannot
believe the discrepant event. This criterion made sense in their work
because the anomalous data (i.e., discrepant events) were the results
of rather complicated scientific experiments and there was room for
students to point out certain kinds of problems regarding the experiments (e.g., insufficient data, inaccurate measurement, faulty methodology, etc.). In our study, however, the discrepant event was not
only a simple experiment but also an example of clear and direct evidence against the initial explanation. This resulted in a situation that
made it more difficult for students to specify their reasons for rejecting the discrepant event. In addition, consideration for the limitations
imposed by the use of a paper-and-pencil test also led us to combine
the two response types. Mason (2001) also pointed out this problem in
studying eighth graders’ responses to anomalous data concerning the
meteor impact theory and/or the classic theory about the Giza pyramids. He suggested that the students who did not agree with the validity of the anomalous data without expressing any reason and did
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not discount their beliefs in the existing conceptions, might have ignored the data in the same way as had the students classified as the
rejection type.
Uncertainty and abeyance also merged into one response type.
Once again, the latter is different from the former in that students do
not provide evident explanations for delaying their final decisions. In
Chinn and Brewer’s (1998) work, a wide range of explanations could
be made because the initial theories allowed respondents to bring
substantial background knowledge to bear. Moreover, the initial theories themselves are only “frontier theories” (Duschl, 1990) for which
debates exist even among scientists. Therefore, students could hold
out the possibility that the initial theory might be able to explain the
anomalous data in the future. In our study, however, it is difficult to
expect such responses because the “sink or float” problem is not so
complex or obscure as to require later evidence and/or explanations.
Unlike ignoring and abeyance, belief decrease is a new response
type in our study. Strictly speaking, however, belief decrease is not
a distinctive response type as compared with the ones Chinn and
Brewer (1998) proposed, because its characteristics are similar to belief change except for the extent of students’ conviction toward abandoning their existing conceptions. As stated earlier, however, belief
decrease responses indicated that students admitted the problems associated with their existing conceptions but they did not completely
give up such conceptions. It is problematic to regard both response
types as identical from the viewpoint of quantifying the degree of cognitive conflict. Thus, we separated belief decrease from belief change
and treated it as an independent response type exclusively with intent to quantify cognitive conflict.
It was found that students had a particular conception regarding
weight (or heaviness) from their responses to the discrepant event.
The term “weight” was used with two different meanings; it was a
kind of homonym. One was the concept of weight of a certain object
possessing almost the same meaning as that used by scientists. The
other was the concept of “natural heaviness” of the certain material;
they regarded matter like iron or stone as heavy materials and matter like wood or plastic as light materials by nature. This latter concept is very similar, not perfect from the scientific point of view, to
that of “density” although the students had not yet formally learned
the concept of density. This early-stage concept of density, however,
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has two facets. Sometimes it helped students to realize that a problem existed with their current conceptions, which led them to abandon their previous beliefs. Twenty-five students changed their existing beliefs on the basis of this early-stage density concept, although
there was still a little confusion about using the term “weight.” Sometimes, on the contrary, it could be an obstacle to learning the scientific concept of density. Another 26 students responded to the discrepant event with reinterpretation, exclusion, or peripheral belief change
on the basis of the same early-stage density concept. It is noteworthy
that an early-stage concept of density functioned, at least for some
students, as an important tool to maintain their existing undifferentiated weight-density conception.
It is very important to clarify the types of responses given by students with respect to discrepant events; such an action can help teachers expect and prepare for students’ possible reactions to conceptual change instruction. From this point of view, the taxonomy Chinn
and Brewer (1998) proposed is very useful. Although the settings of
their study were rather different from those of practical classrooms
(e.g., several different theories and several pieces of anomalous data),
their taxonomy accurately anticipated most middle school students’
response types.
The distribution of students’ responses in this study was very different, however, from that reported by Chinn and Brewer (1998) (Table 1). Compared to those reported by Chinn and Brewer, the percentages of rejection (including ignoring), reinterpretation, and
uncertainty (including abeyance) were relatively smaller, whereas
the percentage of belief change was much higher in our study. A possible reason for such disparate differences might be associated with
the characteristics of the respective topics used. Unlike our study,
Chinn and Brewer selected frontier theories, possessing rival alternatives, as the initial theories and presented students with evidence
from rather complicated and expert scientific experiments as discrepant events. There might be more room for students to raise questions
regarding the validity of the discrepant events in those contexts because the topics chosen had inherent unsolved problems. Therefore, a
greater frequency of responses such as rejection, reinterpretation, and
uncertainty should not be unusual in their study. In addition, as Mason (2001) pointed out, the discrepant events that Chinn and Brewer
used possessed a peculiar characteristic in which students had to rely
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only on the argumentative plausibility and the justifiability as they
appeared in the given texts. In contrast, the discrepant event used in
our study – a “sink or float” experiment – must be one of the most frequently experienced phenomena in students’ everyday life. Thus, students could have pictured the discrepant event and/or related experience in their mind and could have judged the value of their existing
conceptions with relative ease, which lead more students to abandon
their existing conceptions.
Cognitive Conflict and Conceptual Change
The role of conflict in cognitive development and/or learning is a
topic of ongoing debate (e.g., Cantor, 1983; Murray, 1983; Zimmerman
& Blom, 1983; see Limón, 2001, for a review in science education).
Most Piagetian advocates (i.e., personal or radical constructivists; Geelan, 1997) hypothesize that cognitive conflict is a precondition for intellectual development. Other researchers, such as social learning theorists, have not considered cognitive conflict as crucial to learning
(Bandura, 1977). Social learning theorists regard learning as a form of
rule acquisition and emphasize other parameters of social experience
like the clarity and consistency of modeled information (Zimmerman,
1977). Some science educators who emphasize the importance of social, environmental, and/or contextual aspects of conceptual change
(e.g., social constructivists) also criticize the use of cognitive conflict
as an instructional strategy. Their reason is that students tend to superficially patch up local inconsistencies without reaching the necessary conceptual change in situations of cognitive conflict (Vosniadou,
1999). The results of this study implied that both positions may have
some validity. First, statistically significant correlations were found
between the degrees of cognitive conflict and conceptual change. This
result can be inferred to mean that cognitive conflict might be an important factor and should be considered in the process of concept
learning. On the other hand, the correlation coefficient was rather low
which means that cognitive conflict might not be as crucial in concept learning as Piagetian advocates expect. Thus, perhaps there is a
strong possibility that cognitive conflict is only one of the important
factors to be considered in concept learning rather than a necessary
prerequisite for it.
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Logical thinking ability was found to be significantly correlated
statistically with cognitive conflict. Students with high logical thinking ability aroused more cognitive conflict after experiencing the discrepant event than those with low ability. A possible interpretation
of this result is that students with low logical thinking ability do not
possess the capability necessary to appropriately evaluate the discrepant event. It is necessary for students to evaluate the validity
of a discrepant event and the degree of inconsistency between such
a discrepant event and their existing conceptions to initiate cognitive conflict (Limón, 2001). The students with low ability might fail
to reach the expected threshold necessary to provoke conflict for the
lack of reasoning skill. This interpretation is consistent with previous research. It was reported that students with higher logical thinking ability tended to reduce conflict on their own whereas those with
lower ability sought information from other sources (Gorsky & Finegold, 1994). Lawson and Thompson (1988) also reported that when a
new theory that is not consistent with their existing one is presented,
concrete-operational students tended to fail to reject the naive theory because they might lack the reasoning skill to internally evaluate
the relative merits and demerits of their naive theory and the competing theory.
Field dependence/independence was also found to be significantly
correlated with cognitive conflict. With respect to the discrepant event
provided, more cognitive conflict was generated among field independent students than for field dependent ones. Witkin et al. (1977)
indicated that field independence is the ability to disembed relevant
information from an irrelevant background. Field independent students also tend to use better organizing and structuring strategies
(Davis, 1991) and to be good at analytical problem solving (Gordon,
1998). The interpretation of this result agrees well with the previous
research. Field independent students might be more capable of detecting the inconsistency between the discrepant event and their existing conceptions, and might approach the information presented in
the discrepant event more analytically than field dependent students.
Therefore, there is a greater possibility of engaging cognitive conflict
among field independent students.
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Implications for Teachers
When teachers plan to teach the concept of density, they should
pay close attention to students’ preinstructional conceptions to eliminate potential obstacles to conceptual change. As stated in the discussion above, at least half of the seventh graders in this study (including those who were excluded from participating as subjects) were
found to have an early-stage density concept even before they formally
learned it in school. The problem, ironically, is that this early-stage
density concept might lead some students to respond to discrepant
events with rejection or reinterpretation while still others respond
with belief change. Therefore, when introducing the concept of density, teachers should emphasize the differentiation between weight
and density because the problem many students have is not that they
do not understand the concept of density but that they cannot distinguish one concept from the other. In addition, the results concerning
the influences of students’ cognitive characteristics on cognitive conflict implied that intimate knowledge of students’ cognitive characteristics is indispensable to teachers who are trying to overcome persistent misconceptions among their students.

Further Research
We defined and quantified, in this study, the degree of cognitive
conflict induced by a discrepant event exclusively from a cognitive
viewpoint. Like all operational definitions of theoretical concepts,
however, the alternative definition for cognitive conflict developed
here cannot respond perfectly to each and every situation because of
the complexity of human learning. Discrepant events, as previously
shown, play an important role in inducing cognitive conflict as well
as initiating students’ motivation to learn through the use of a learning cycle (Lawson, Abraham, & Renner, 1989) or generative learning model (Osborne & Freyberg, 1985). It was reported that students
showed more curiosity and interest when the given phenomenon or
information is not consistent with their expectations (e.g., Frick, 1992;
Yarlas & Gelman, 1998).
The interest stimulated by an inconsistent experience (i.e., discrepant events) could lead students to pay more attention to the learning
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material. In addition, evidence from previous research suggested that
interest not only motivates students to learn but also influences comprehension and learning (see Schraw & Lehman, 2001, for a review).
Pintrich (1999) and Pintrich, Marx, and Boyle (1993) suggested that
motivational constructs, such as mastery goal orientation, adoption
of a constructivist belief about learning, higher levels of personal interest, self-efficacy, and personal control, should be potential mediators of the process of conceptual change. Hidi (1990) also suggested
that the concept of interest should be recognized as an integral part
of cognition and incorporated into expanded theories on the subject.
Considering these suggestions, further research including the examination of the motivational role of conflict is needed to get a comprehensive understanding regarding the role of cognitive conflict in conceptual change.
The processes which comprise the phenomenon of learning, especially in practical classrooms, are very complicated because many interactions among students, teacher, and environments simultaneously
occur. In this study, we purposely ruled out student(s)-student(s),
teacher-student(s), and student(s)-environment interactions in order to isolate conditions as far as possible for all participants. Our decision for excluding the interactions might underestimate the interdependent relationships among those variables investigated in this
study and the need for these interactions. The intervention of this
study may be too short (i.e., the administration of both the TRDE and
the CAI corresponds to about one class period of normal instruction).
However, the content could be covered in one class period under the
National Science Curriculum of Korea, and the result of a conceptual
change instruction in our previous study indicated that the intervention of one class period was reasonably successful at least in learning
the basic density concept (Noh et al., 1997). Further investigation may
be needed to reveal the influence of intervention time on the relationship between cognitive conflict and conceptual change.
Considering that initial belief changes are not very stable, a further
piece of research to test the longevity of the changed beliefs (e.g., administering a retention conception test) might reveal other aspects of
the relationship between cognitive conflict and conceptual change. In
order to understand the relationship between students’ logical thinking ability and cognitive conflict, further research is also needed. Students who are above a certain threshold level in logical thinking ability

Kang et al. in Research in Science Education 34 (2004)

28

may benefit from cognitive conflict, while those below the threshold
level may not identify the conflict. Finally, considering the result that
students’ reasoning skill and cognitive style influenced the degree of
cognitive conflict they experienced, further research is also needed to
find out the most appropriate content and/or type of discrepant events
to use; content/type of discrepant event(s) that is consistent with students’ cognitive characteristics.
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